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Independence campaigners in both Scotland and Catalonia have advocated retaining their EU
membership post-independence. Merijn Chamon and Guillaume Van der Loo  assess the legal
basis on which subnational entities could maintain EU membership after declaring independence.
They write that while the EU treaties make no explicit reference to this situation, it would be difficult
for a seamless transition to take place. This is partly because EU accession negotiations could only
be concluded with a fully recognised state, which would inevitably entail a gap between the
establishment of a region’s independence and their ability to conclude negotiations over EU
membership.
2014 will be an important year for a number of regions in the EU. Political developments in the UK,
Spain and Belgium have seen subnational entities – Scotland, Catalonia and Flanders – become
increasingly autonomous. Today, political movements in all three regions are openly calling for
independence and, having achieved this, to become established as EU member states in their own
right.
One major hurdle to such aspirations is the silence of the EU treaties on the possibility for
subnational Member State entities to become individual Member States. Although the Treaties foresee a procedure
to join or even withdraw from the Union, they do not provide such EU ‘breakaway’ regions with a legal basis to join
or remain in the EU after secession. In a recent article we looked at this legal and political hurdle in a more
elaborate way.
According to the European Commission and the
President of the European Council, such regions would
lose their EU status upon independence and would
have to re-apply for membership under Article 49 TEU.
Although we have argued that both international and EU
law seem to support this position, proponents of the
above-mentioned aspirations, like the Scottish
Government in its paper ‘Scotland in the European
Union’, raise a number of arguments to refute that
thesis. They argue that if the region’s independence has
been acquired on the basis of a constitutional and
democratic process in line with the core values of the
EU enumerated in Article 2 TEU, the new country may
become an EU Member State on the date of its de iure
independence. This would avoid any disruption to the
continuity of the region’s current position in the EU.
Article 2 TEU lays down that the European Union is
founded on a number of core values and one could
indeed conclude from that provision that the EU would have to respect the outcome of an (internal) political process
which complies with those core values. In the present case, this would mean recognising the independence of a
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region. However, the obligation to respect core values such as human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, and the
rule of law, would not extend to an obligation to allow a new Member State into the EU following a procedure
different from the one provided for by the Treaties. This would hold even if this applicant state has been a regional
entity of a current Member State.
Another argument invoked by proponents is of a pragmatic nature. It is indeed true that it would not be in the
immediate interest of the existing Member States to keep such a new independent state outside of the EU, given it
previously formed part of the EU. However, from an equally pragmatic perspective, there is also a clear desire to
prevent a potential balkanisation of the EU. The Member States would also therefore have an interest in preventing
a precedent for the erosion of their territorial integrity. As a result, while some pragmatic reasons do exist to grant
immediate EU Member State status to such regions, the picture is not unequivocally positive from this perspective.
A third argument which has been invoked is that the leitmotif of the EU is enlargement of its membership, rather than
contraction. However, while the EU would indeed contract if a region left the EU, it would also not enlarge if that
region became a Member State. Instead the EU would simply fragment. In addition, it is questionable whether
enlargement really is the leitmotif of the EU. The main (political) goal of the EU is creating ‘an ever closer union
among the peoples of Europe’, as laid down in the preamble to the TEU. Fragmentation sits uncomfortably with this,
since a people would choose to reject and dissolve a bilateral union, but at the same time subscribe to an ever
closer multilateral union (within the EU) – including with the very same state from which it had seceded.
As regards procedure, it has been advanced by the Scottish Government that a region would not have to follow the
traditional enlargement procedure of Article 49 TEU, but that Article 48 TEU could be used. Article 48 TEU provides
for the possibility of an amendment of the EU Treaties, following an inter-governmental conference. The idea would
be that the existing 28 Member States would amend the Treaties to secure the post-independence membership of
the region.
However, the resulting Treaty would then only be concluded between the 28 existing Member States, whereas a
normal accession Treaty is concluded between the existing Member States and the new Member State. The
possibility for such a region to become an EU Member State without concluding an agreement with the existing
Member States would go against the CJEU’s pronouncement that it is not possible for the EU to comprise a greater
number of Member States than the number of States between which it is established.
A solution through Article 48 TEU would of course have an obvious appeal for the regions concerned because it
would allow a smooth transition period. Otherwise the region would be confronted with a temporal paradox. Ideally it
would want to become both independent and an EU Member State on the same day, but in order to negotiate its
accession to the EU on its own behalf, instead of through its original state, it would need to be an internationally
recognised independent entity. However, before a state-entity is usually recognised as a subject of international law
it needs to have acquired its independence. Indeed, recognition by all 28 EU Member States will be a conditio sine
qua non for the breakaway region to join the Union. However, it is questionable whether all the Member States,
especially those who are struggling with such breakaway regions themselves, would be enthusiastic about
recognising such a new state.
As a result, there would almost certainly be a gap between a region’s formal independence and the start and
conclusion of its accession negotiations with the EU. But if the region might rely on its original Member State to
negotiate a transitional arrangement for it, this temporal paradox might be overcome. These are only some of the
problems which a few years ago were only discussed as an intellectual pastime. However, this year might see those
issues gain a very real significance and no doubt upcoming events will be closely followed in all EU capitals.
For a longer discussion of this topic, see the authors’ recent article in the European Law Journal
Please read our comments policy before commenting .
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Note: This article gives the views of the author, and not the position of EUROPP – European Politics and Policy, nor
of the London School of Economics.
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_________________________________
About the authors
Merijn Chamon – Ghent University
Merijn Chamon is Academic Assistant and PhD Researcher in the European Institute of the
University of Ghent (Jean Monnet Centre of Excellence). He is especially interested in the broader
realm of EU institutional and constitutional law. His PhD research centres on the limits to the
agencification of the EU administration.
Guillaume Van der Loo  – Ghent University
Guillaume Van der Loo is PhD Researcher for the “Special Research Fund” (BOF) in the European
Institute of the University of Ghent (Jean Monnet Centre of Excellence). His research interests are
the EU trade policy and the Union’s proximity relations. His PhD research focuses on the
possibilities and limits of EU integration without membership through the conclusion of a new
generation of association and trade agreements, with Ukraine as a case study.
3/3
